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1. Introduction
Judges often defend a legal decision by referring to the consequences of
application of a particular legal rule in the concrete case. In the legal literature,
such pragmatic argumentation, which refers to the consequences of a
decision, is not always considered as a sound justification of a legal decision.
One of the reasons why pragmatic argumentation is often considered as a
weak justification is that reference to the favourable or unfavourable
consequences of a particular decision is often used as a rhetorical technique
to conceal the real motives for that decision. Many authors are of the opinion
that such a form of argumentation hides considerations that ought be made
explicit. On the other hand, there are authors who stress that an advantage of
an explicit reference to the consequences of a decision may be that it serves
to clarify a choice between various arguments, a choice which often remains
implicit.
Because pragmatic argumentation is becoming an important way to defend a
legal decision, it is worthwhile determining what this form of argumentation
exactly amounts to, and under what circumstances it may form an acceptable
way to defend a legal decision. In this paper, I will address the role that
pragmatic argumentation can play in the justification of the interpretation of a
legal rule. The central question is whether pragmatic argumentation can form a
sufficient defence as an independent argument, or whether it can only
constitute an acceptable defence in combination with other arguments. If the
latter should prove to be the case, the question is what the exact relation is
between pragmatic arguments and other arguments.
To place these questions in a broader context, in section 2 I will first sketch the
various views on the acceptability of pragmatic argumentation. In section 3 I
will develop and describe various forms and extensions of pragmatic
argumentation which can be used as an instrument in the analysis of pragmatic
argumentation, and in 4, on the basis of an exemplary analysis of a decision of
the Dutch Supreme Court, I will clarify the role of pragmatic argumentation in
the justification of a legal decision.
 
2. Ideas about the acceptability of pragmatic argumentation
In the literature on pragmatic argumentation, broadly speaking, there are three
main views as to the criteria which may be adopted to determine the rightness
of a claim or action. On the basis of these views, three approaches can be
distinguished as to the question whether pragmatic argumentation offers a
sound defence for a moral or legal decision. According to a deontological or
moralist approach, pragmatic argumentation can never constitute a sound
defence for a moral or legal decision. For a sufficient justification, arguments
referring to moral or legal values are required. According to a
consequentialist, utilitarian or teleological approach, pragmatic
argumentation can, on its own, constitute a sufficient defence of a moral or
legal decision. According to an ethical-pluralistic approach, which employs a
mixture of consequentialist and moralist arguments, pragmatic argumentation
should be complemented by arguments demonstrating that the decision is
coherent and consistent with accepted rules and principles.
Although these approaches are distinct in theory, most authors in modern legal
theory and legal philosophy who devote attention to pragmatic argumentation
can be considered as representatives of an ethical-pluralistic approach in
which the two other approaches are combined. Most authors such as Bell
(1983), MacCormick (1978), MacCormick and Summers (1991), Twining and
Miers (1994) are of the opinion that pragmatic argumentation can form an
acceptable defence in combination with arguments which show that the
presented legal interpretation is coherent and consistent with certain legal
values, principles or goals. In this approach, pragmatic arguments and other
arguments complement each other.
 
3. A model for the analysis of pragmatic argumentation
3.1 Two forms of pragmatic argumentation
In section 2 it became clear that pragmatic argumentation must always be
complemented by other arguments in order to provide a sufficient defence of a
legal decision. This view raises two, interrelated, questions: which other
arguments can be used to make the argumentation 'complete' and what is the
exact relation between pragmatic arguments and other arguments? To answer
these questions, I will use a model for pragmatic argumentation I have
sketched at the last OSSA conference (Feteris 1998). On the basis of this
model I will describe various forms of pragmatic argumentation and I will
describe the various types of arguments which can be used to make the
argumentation complete.
Starting from the basic model, two forms of pragmatic argumentation can be
distinguished. In the first form, the positive form, a decision is defended by
referring to the desirable consequences of the chosen interpretation of the
legal rule, and in the second negative form, a decision is defended by referring
to the undesirable consequences of the chosen interpretation of the legal rule.
In schema:
Positive form
Interpretation X is desirable
Because: Interpretation X leads to Y
and: Y is desirable
Negative form
Interpretation X' is undesirable
Because: Interpretation X' leads to Y'
and: Y' is undesirable
 
3.2 Expansions of pragmatic argumentation
As we have seen in section 2, to make the justification complete, pragmatic
argumentation needs to be complemented by other arguments. From a
pragma-dialectical perspective, two kinds of expansions can be distinguished:
a support of pragmatic argumentation consisting of subordinative
argumentation, and a supplement to pragmatic argumentation consisting of
coordinative argumentation.
Supporting pragmatic argumentation by subordinative argumentation
To support the argument that a particular consequence or result is desirable or
undesirable, a judge often mentions that the result is desirable or undesirable
given a particular goal or a particular value. Such a goal or value, in its turn, is
often defended by referring to the intention of the legislator, the purport of the
rule, or general legal principles. In pragma-dialectical terms, such a step-by-




Level 1 Interpretation X is desirable
Because: Interpretation X leads to Y
and: Y is desirable
 
Level 2 Y is desirable
Because: Y is in accordance with goal/value Z
and: Z is desirable
 
Level 3 Z is desirable




Interpretation X' is undesirable
Because: Interpretation X' leads to Y'




Because: Y' is not in accordance with goal/value Z




Because: the intention of the legislator/the purport of the rule/general legal
principles
 
In section 4, in an analysis of a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court, I will
show how the various levels of subordinate argumentation can be represented.
Supplementing pragmatic argumentation by coordinative
argumentation
As a supplement to pragmatic argumentation, judges often put forward other
arguments referring to the text of the law, the legal system, the intention of the
legislator, or the purport of the rule. When such supplementary arguments are
given, in pragma-dialectical terms, three kinds of relations between the
pragmatic argument and the other arguments can be distinguished.
First, pragmatic argumentation can constitute a sufficient defence of the
interpretation, supplemented by other argumentation. In this case, the
argumentation is asymmetrical coordinative argumentation. To express the
asymmetrical relation between the independent pragmatic argument and the
supplementary argument (which is dependent on the pragmatic argument), I






& [1b  Other argument(s)]
 
Schema 1: Asymmetrical coordinative argumentation with independent
pragmatic argumentation
Second, pragmatic argumentation can constitute a necessary complement of
other argumentation which, on its own, does not provide a sufficient defence. In
this case, the argumentation is symmetrical coordinative argumentation. To
express the symmetrical relation between the dependent pragmatic argument





&  1b Other argument(s)
Schema 2: Asymmetrical coordinative argumentation with dependent
pragmatic argumentation
Third, pragmatic argumentation can constitute a supplement to other
argumentation which, on its own, constitutes a sufficient defence. In this case,
the argumentation is asymmetrical coordinative argumentation. To express
the asymmetrical relation between the dependent pragmatic argument and the




[1a Pragmatic argument] &  1b Other argument(s)
 
Schema 3: Asymmetrical coordinative argumentation with dependent
pragmatic argumentation
4. An exemplary analysis of pragmatic argumentation
Using the analytic model and distinctions described above, I will analyze a
decision of the Dutch Supreme Court. On the basis of this analysis I will explain
the role that pragmatic argumentation can play in the justification of a legal
decision.
In this case, the defendant is sentenced by default by the judge of first instance.
The appeal judge overturns the decision, and concludes that the defendant
was right, but ruled that he was still obliged to pay the costs of the procedure in
first instance because he had failed to appear. The appeal judge bases his
decision on clause 89 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, which states that
'the costs of the default of appearance, and the costs which are caused by the
defendant's failure to appear, must be paid by the defendant'.
The central question in the procedure before the Supreme Court is whether the
defendant had to pay the costs of the procedure in first instance, although,
eventually, he had won the case on appeal. The debate concentrates on the
interpretation of the above mentioned clause 89 of the Dutch Code of Civil
Procedure.
The Supreme Court opts for interpretation X, that the defendant is not obliged
to pay the costs of the procedure of first instance if he finally wins. He justifies
this interpretation first by saying that interpretation X' (defended by the court of
appeal), that the defendant must pay the costs of the procedure of first
instance, would have undesirable results, and then by saying that interpretation
X had desirable results. Using the earlier developed analytic instruments, we
can make the following analysis:
Justification of interpretation X:
Level 1 Standpoint: An interpretation of clause 89 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in a strict sense, implying that it only prescribes
that the costs of non-appearance must be paid by the defendant, is
desirable
Argument 1a: This interpretation leads to the fair result that the
defendant (who finally wins the case) is not obliged to pay the costs
which are not related to his initial non-appearance
(Argument 1b: It is fair that the defendant is not obliged to pay the
costs which are not related to his initial non-appearance)
and
Argument 1c: The history of the rule and the text of the rule do not
prevent a strict interpretation because the history of the rule dates
back a long way and the text is not that compelling
Level 2 (Argument 1b: It is fair that the defendant is not obliged to
pay the costs which are not related to his initial non-appearance)
(Argument 1b.1a: This case is about the costs from which it can be
said that, given the origin of these costs, it is fair that they must be
paid by the person who has caused them, independent of the
outcome of the trial)
Argument 1b.1b: It is fair that the costs must be paid by the person
who has caused them, independent of the outcome of the trial
Level 3 Argument 1b.1b: It is fair that the costs must be paid by the
person who has caused them, independent of the outcome of the
trial
Argument 1b.1b.1: This opinion is in accordance with the intention
of the legislator, expressed in the opinion in rules formulated later
which concern the awarding of costs and also underlying the
system of the law, especially the clauses 56 and 89a
and
Justification of the refutation of interpretation X':
Level 1 Standpoint: An interpretation of clause 89 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in a broad sense, implying that it prescribes that
the costs of non-appearance must be paid by the defendant, is
undesirable
Argument 1a: This interpretation leads to the unfair result that the
defendant (who finally wins the case) is obliged to pay the costs
which are not related to his initial non-appearance
(Argument 1b: It is unfair that the defendant is obliged to pay the
costs which are not related to his initial non-appearance)
Argument 1c: The history of the law dates back a long way, and the
text of the clause is not so compelling that it would impede an
interpretation in the strict sense
In its defence, the Supreme Court offers a 'maximal' justification by giving pro-
argumentation for the chosen interpretation and contra-argumentation against
the refuted interpretation. In both cases, the Court also gives supplementary
arguments besides the pragmatic arguments.
The argumentation in defence of interpretation X consists of a complete
defence according to the model developed in section 3 for a support for
pragmatic argumentation. The interpretation is defended on the first level by
referring to the favourable consequences of this interpretation, and on the
second level by formulating a certain legal principle underlying the rules relating
to the non-appearance of the defendant, which is defended on the third level by
the intention of the legislator and the system of the law. As a supplementary
coordinative argument, the Supreme Court gives argument 1c.
The standpoint of the Supreme Court, in which it refutes interpretation X', is
defended by argumentation saying that interpretation X' has undesirable
results. As a supplement to this argumentation, consisting of 1a and 1b, the
Supreme Court puts forward argument 1c.
When the Supreme Court weighs these two interpretations, we see that the
Court explicitly says why the chosen interpretation has desirable results and
the refuted interpretation undesirable results. The Court also says why the
reasons in favour of the restricted interpretation X weigh more heavily than the
reasons in favour of the broad interpretation X'.
From the perspective of an ethical-pluralist approach of pragmatic
argumentation, the argumentation of the Supreme Court meets the
requirement that the choice for an interpretation be defended by referring to the
consequences of the interpretation as well as by relating the desirability of
these consequences to a certain legal principle which is supposed to underlie
the relevant rules and to the intention of the legislator. In this case, pragmatic
argumentation is not a rhetorical formula, but an explicit account of the choices




This analysis of the argumentation of the Supreme Court and other analyses of
Supreme Court decisions show that pragmatic argumentation never occurs in
'isolation'. The analyses show that pragmatic argumentation sometimes
constitutes an independent defence, but in such cases it is always supported
by other legal arguments. In most cases, these other arguments consist of an
appeal to the goal or the purport of the rule, the intention of the legislator, the
legal system, a legal principle, or a combination of the goal of the rule and the
legal system. In other situations, pragmatic argumentation is presented in
combination as a supplement of other arguments, sometimes as necessary
complement, sometimes as a reinforcement.
The way in which the Dutch Supreme Court uses pragmatic argumentation
amounts to an ethical-pluralist approach. Such an approach also coincides
with a modern tradition of the application of law in which it is not only important
that the decision fits within the legal system, but also that the decision has
desirable results. As a conclusion, we might say that, on the basis of analysis
of the use of pragmatic argumentation by the Dutch Supreme Court, it could be
said that the various approaches to the importance of pragmatic
argumentation converge, as is also claimed in the ethical pluralist approach.
The answer to the question about the role of pragmatic argumentation is that it
can offer an acceptable justification of a legal decision, provided that judges try
to make explicit which value judgements and which legal basis for these
judgements are underlying the assessment of the desirability of the results.
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